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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper develops a general theoretical framework within which a heterogeneous group 
taxpayers confront a market that supplies a variety of schemes for reducing tax liability, and 
uses this framework to explore the impact of a wide range of anti-avoidance policies.  
Schemes differ in their legal effectiveness and hence in the risks to which they expose 
taxpayers - risks which go beyond the risk of audit considered in the conventional literature 
on evasion.  Given the individual taxpayer’s circumstances, the prices charged for the 
schemes and the policy environment, the model predicts (i) whether or not any given 
taxpayer will acquire a scheme, and (ii) if they do so, which type of scheme they will acquire.   
The paper then analyses how these decisions, and hence the tax gap, are influenced by four 
generic types of policy: 
• Disclosure – earlier information leading to faster closure of loopholes; 
• Penalties – introduction of penalties for failed avoidance; 
• Policy Design – fundamental policy changes that design out opportunities for avoidance; 
• Product Register -  the introduction of GAARs or mini-GAARs that give greater clarity 
about how different types of scheme will be treated.  
The paper shows that when considering the indirect/behavioural effects of policies on the tax 
gap it is important to recognise that these operate on two different margins.  First policies 
will have  deterrence effects  – their impact on the quantum of taxpayers choosing to acquire 
different types schemes as distinct to acquiring no scheme at all.  There will be a range of 
such deterrence effects reflecting the range of schemes available in the market.  But 
secondly, since different schemes generate different tax gaps, policies will also have 
switching effects as they induce taxpayers who previously acquired one type of scheme to 
acquire another.  The first three types of policy generate positive deterrence effects but differ 
in the switching effects they produce.  The fourth type of policy produces mixed deterrence 
effects.    
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Avoidance Policies – A New Conceptual Framework  
 
Introduction 
 
Tax avoidance is a major policy challenge to fiscal authorities in virtually all advanced 
economies.  Not only does it account for a significant amount of revenue loss but it has a 
number of other problematic features. 
• A considerable amount of economic resources are tied up creating, selling, implementing, 
countering and investigating tax avoidance schemes that are essentially artificial paper 
transactions that serve no economic purpose other than reducing tax liability. 
• Because avoidance schemes are often very sophisticated, they are also expensive and so 
not available to all taxpayers.  This leads to a situation where different taxpayers are 
paying tax at different rates on the same economic activity.  This creates an inefficient 
allocation of resources, since taxpayers gain a competitive advantage not through superior 
technology or products but through greater access to and/or willingness to use avoidance 
schemes. 
• This also produces a manifest sense of unfairness, producing both horizontal and vertical 
inequality. 
 
A second reason why avoidance presents policy challenges is that there is a very active 
market in producing and devising avoidance schemes, so fiscal authorities need to consider 
the effects of their actions on not just the demand for schemes but also the supply.   
 
Finally tax avoidance poses a significant policy challenge because avoidance schemes – at 
least those that are well devised and well implemented – are legal and therefore will not 
always be countered through the conventional methods of investigations that lead to the 
repayment of tax plus interest plus penalties.  In addition to the possible use of 
penalties/investigations, fiscal authorities therefore have to consider other ways of countering 
avoidance: 
• Policy design; 
• GAARS;  the “coherent principles” approach to tax law design3; 
• Information powers such as disclosure and retrospection.  
                                                          
3   See Pinder (2006) 
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 To make sensible decisions about how best to counter avoidance, there are a number of things 
fiscal authorities need to be able to understand. 
• What effects do these different policies have on the level of non-compliance? 
• What effects do these different policies have on the type of non-compliance?  Do 
measures to counter avoidance drive taxpayers towards tax planning or tax evasion? 
• What effects do they have – both individually and in combination – on the tax gap and, 
more widely, on economic welfare?  
 
Yet following Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the focus of virtually all the economic analysis 
of tax non-compliance has essentially been on evasion4.  While these models produce useful 
insights they suffer from a number of limitations when it comes to thinking systematically 
about the above questions: 
• The focus is on a single decision – how much of a reduction in tax liability a taxpayer 
would seek.  It does not address the choice of how to obtain this reduction in liability. 
• The focus is on a single taxpayer and does not consider the wider market for schemes.   
• A limited number of instruments are considered – typically penalties and effectiveness of 
investigations. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a new framework for thinking about avoidance and 
policies to counter it that overcomes the above limitations.  In particular the framework has 
the following properties. 
• Taxpayers confront a market that produces a range of possible avoidance schemes that 
will reduce their tax liability.  These schemes can vary from very effective schemes that 
in some ways come close to tax planning through to less effective schemes that, in the 
limit, might be close to evasion. Taxpayers have to decide not only whether to acquire a 
scheme – and hence their  quantum of tax  non-compliance – but also which scheme to 
acquire  
• To characterise the differences in the different schemes it is necessary to consider a 
multiplicity of different risks that taxpayers face – and not just a single risk of detection 
                                                          
4 Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998),  Cowell (1990), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), provide overviews of 
much of the developments on behaviour.   The paper by Feldstein (1999)  has initiated a stream of work on 
measuring the welfare costs of non-compliance. 
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and penalties.  Taxpayers can mitigate their risks through the choice of scheme to 
acquire. 
• There is a multitude of taxpayers who differ in both the size of their tax base – and hence 
in their incentives to be non-compliant - as well as in their attitudes/values towards 
compliance – specifically the reputational concern they have about being identified as 
doing anything that might be deemed illegal and so possibly incur a penalty.   
• The market can therefore be thought of as offering a range of products differing in a 
number of dimensions.  If there were no differences in taxpayer attitudes these products 
could be ranked by a single quality index, and we would have a market which was 
vertically differentiated with higher quality products selling at a higher price.  However, 
differences in taxpayer attitudes generate an element of horizontal differentiation, so the 
market is differentiated both vertically and horizontally.   
• Although de facto the market for schemes is dominated by a number of large players, for 
the purposes of this paper I will take it that there is enough competition that prices are 
effectively determined by simply costs and so will not be affected by policies5.  The 
framework explains which types of taxpayers acquire which types of scheme. 
• There are many different types of policy instrument, and the framework produces 
comparative static predictions of the effects of different type of policy on both the 
amount and the nature of non-compliance, and hence on the size of the tax gap. 
• An important implication of the framework is that when considering the impact of 
policies on the tax gap then in addition to the usual direct effects – the direct impact of 
policies on the magnitude of the tax gap associated with any particular type of scheme -
there are now two different types of indirect/behavioural effects that need to be taken 
into account  
(i) The first  is the deterrence effect  - taxpayers stop acquiring schemes that 
lower their tax liability.   However in a framework that allows for different 
types of scheme there will be different deterrence effects on different schemes.  
So it may sometimes be the case that the deterrence effect of a particular 
policy is positive for some schemes but negative for others. 
(ii) The second is the switching effect – taxpayers switch the type of scheme they 
acquire.  The sign of the switching effect will depend on (a) the direction in 
                                                          
5 In a companion paper, Damjanovic and Ulph (2009) we explore the implications of having an imperfectly 
competitive market where prices are affected by policies, but this is for the simpler case where there is just a 
single type of scheme available. 
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which taxpayers switch; (b) the size of the tax gap for different types of 
scheme.  As we will see, the tax gap for high quality avoidance schemes may 
be higher or lower than that for lower quality schemes. 
 
Since the framework allows for there being a range of possible avoidance schemes it could, 
under some interpretations, be thought of as encompassing both pure tax planning and pure 
evasion as extreme cases.  However this is not the interpretation that is proposed in this 
paper6.   Therefore a full analysis that encompasses tax planning, tax avoidance and tax 
evasion would require a somewhat different framework than that employed here, one which 
treats both planning and evasion as somewhat discretely different from avoidance.   
 
                                                          
6 The approach underlying this paper is that tax avoidance arises whenever for a given allocation of real 
resources by a taxpayer (production/consumption plans) the taxpayer resorts to a set of artificial/paper 
transactions that converts the streams of income that would have arisen naturally from these real resources into 
different income streams which would have arisen naturally from an alternative real allocation of resources and 
so enables the taxpayer to obtain a lower tax rate.  While there is an element of artificiality there is no 
concealment or misrepresentation of their affairs.  By contrast pure tax planning involves  taxpayers in 
rearranging their real affairs (production /consumption plans) to obtain the best outcome in terms of profits 
(firms) or utility (individuals) while paying tax at the statutory rates on the incomes that arise naturally from 
these real plans.  To the extent that this rearrangement lowers the rate of tax they pay, this comes at a cost of 
having to choose a less attractive real allocation than would be desirable if there were no differences in tax rates.  
It is this real cost that taxpayers are avoiding by the use of avoidance schemes.  Of course taxpayers using tax 
planning may need to pay for good advice in order to choose the best arrangement of their affairs and this be 
interpreted as using a scheme.  But the crucial difference between tax planning and tax avoidance is that tax 
planning involves a real cost over and above that of acquiring  the scheme/advice.  On the other hand, tax 
evasion involves deliberate concealment or misrepresentation of the taxpayers’ affairs and the certain 
knowledge that this is illegal, and the type of taxpayers willing to do this may not  be the  same as those willing 
to engage in tax avoidance.  By way of illustration consider a firm facing different rates of corporation tax in 
different countries.  It faces the choice of locating some  production facility either in country A or country B.  
Gross profits would be higher in country A than in country B but if the tax rate in country B was sufficiently far 
below that in country A it might relocate to country B – tax planning.  Alternatively it might seek to retain its 
production in country A but find some artificial way of shifting its profits to country B – albeit at a cost of 
setting up a complex set of artificial transactions – tax avoidance.  Finally it could keep its production in country 
A but, in completing its tax return simply declare its profits as arising in country B – tax evasion.  
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The paper is in four sections.  The first section sets out the basic model; the second derives  
the equilibrium predictions about  which types of taxpayer acquire which type of scheme and 
hence the size of the tax gap.  The third derives the comparative static predictions about the 
effects of different types of policies on taxpayer behaviour and the implications of this for the 
tax gap, while the fourth concludes.   
 
Section 1  The Model 
 
Consider a taxpayer with tax base Y.   
 
The taxpayer considers acquiring a tax avoidance scheme that will lower the rate of tax on 
this base by the amount , giving a potential full tax saving 0tΔ > YtT .Δ=Δ 7.    This 
avoidance scheme is one of a class of avoidance schemes that exploit a particular differential 
in tax rates between very similar activities.  These different rates could reflect: 
• the internal tax policies of a given jurisdiction -for example the fact that in the UK 
National Insurance contributions are imposed on earned income but not unearned 
income; 
• differences in tax policies in different jurisdictions; 
• opportunities to shift taxable income across time and so get a lower discounted tax 
rate. 
In what follows the differential tax rate tΔ  will be referred to as the tax wedge. 
 
There may be many different ways of constructing schemes that exploit any given tax rate 
differential.   So the taxpayer faces a market in which there are a number of different schemes 
produced and sold by various companies8.  They all deliver the same reduction  in the tax 
rate but differ in both the risks with which they face the taxpayer and their prices.    To 
describe these risks and the prices consider for the moment a single generic scheme.   
tΔ
 
                                                          
7 Implicit in this is the idea that this all refers to a specific period of time – say a tax year – over which tax is 
due.  
8 Since, as indicated above, all schemes are going to be sold at a price equal to their marginal cost, it would be 
possible to allow for in-house schemes produced by taxpayers that can match the least-cost technology in the 
market.  
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1.1    A Generic Scheme 
Each scheme confronts the taxpayer with the following five risks.  
 
Risk 1    Legal Effectivenes 
The first risk is whether or not the scheme works in law – is legally effective.   The 
significance of a scheme’s being effective is that in this case the tax authorities have no 
powers to recover any tax saved let alone impose any penalties for the use of such a scheme.   
 
However if a scheme is ineffective, and if a taxpayer is detected and successfully challenged 
for using such a scheme then the tax authorities can recover the tax saved (plus interest) and 
may be able to impose a penalty  - to the extent that the tax authority has a policy of 
penalising failed avoidance schemes9.   
 
Whether or not a scheme works is ultimately determined by the courts.  For a scheme to work 
in law it must be that case that every step in what is often a very complex sequence of 
transactions must work and must also be properly implemented.  Assume that, for some 
schemes at least, at the time that the taxpayer acquires the scheme, there could be some scope 
for doubt as to whether or not it really does work.  So let , 0 1e ep p≤ ≤
e
  be the probability 
that the taxpayer attaches at the time of acquisition to the scheme’s being effective.  This 
probability will be based on advice that the taxpayer will have received when the scheme is 
supplied.  It is assumed that this is good advice and that p  is the true probability of the 
scheme’s effectiveness and is the same for all taxpayers.   
 
The value of ep  will vary across schemes. 
 
Risk 2.  Legislative Change 
Even if a scheme works in law, there is still a risk that the tax authority10 decides that the 
arrangements on which the scheme depends for generating the tax saving involve the 
exploitation of some “loophole” in the legislation and takes legislative action to close the 
                                                          
9 Such a policy would of course be controversial  
10 Strictly speaking it is ultimately Parliament that decides to pass legislation closing loopholes, this legislation 
being introduced by Ministers, this decision drawing on advice by tax authority.  Bit for purposes of this paper 
these distinctions do not matter – all that matters is the probability of legislation being introduced.  So, for 
simplicity, I will continue to talk about the tax authority as being the decision maker on this issue.  
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loophole thus making the scheme incapable of delivering the saving.     Let   
be the probability that the legislation is unchanged so 
, 0 1`u up p≤ ≤
( )1 up−  is the probability that the 
loophole will be closed.  Again these are the probabilities at the time of acquisition.  
 
Whether or not the tax authority closes the loophole will depend on a number of factors 
amongst which is the number of  taxpayers using the scheme – or anticipated to use it.  For  
the purposes of this paper it is assumed that the likelihood of the loophole being closed 
depends solely on the nature of the loophole e.g.  the extent to which it is thought by the tax 
authority to significantly breach the spirit of existing legislation.  As above it is assumed that 
the taxpayer obtains good advice about this at the time of acquisition and so knows the true 
value of up  
 
The probability up  will vary across schemes.  Although the authority’s decision to close a 
loophole is assumed to depend solely on the nature of the loophole,  the precise values of up   
and the way these values vary across schemes will depend on policies implemented by the tax 
authority – and in particular its willingness to give clear guidance.  At one extreme the tax 
authority may have a very clear view of what types of scheme/loophole it will try to close and 
what types of scheme it will not close.  So whether this clarity of viewpoint is communicated 
(effectively) to taxpayers, or whether they just come to learn it over time, we can characterise 
this situation as one in which there will be a broad range of schemes for which  , 
another broad range of schemes for which 
1up =
0up = , and only a very narrow range of schemes 
for which .  This is the case where the authority offers clear guidance or creates 
what are often called “bright lines”.   Alternatively the authority may be either unable or 
unwilling to give clear guidance on what types of loopholes it will seek to close and decide 
everything on a case-by-case basis, with perhaps just a few illustrations of the types of things 
that would definitely lead to legislative action and the types of things that would not.  We 
could capture this situation by assuming that there is a very narrow range of  schemes for 
which  (so authority  will definitely take no legislative action) and another narrow 
range where  (so the authority will definitely take legislative action)  there is a wide  
range of schemes for which it is unclear whether or not the tax authority will act, and so 
.  Indeed in the case of very considerable uncertainty, it could be that for most of 
0 p< <
1=
up
1<
1u
0=
up
0 up<
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the schemes in this latter range 1
2u
p = .   We can therefore characterise policies such as 
purposive drafting that aim at giving greater clarity/ guidance to taxpayers as  a policy that 
raises up  for high quality schemes but lowers it for low quality schemes. 
 
Risk 3  Speed of Legislative Action 
If the scheme works in law, but will be closed through legislative action, the taxpayer has to 
think about the speed with which the loophole on which it depends will be closed down, and, 
if it is closed, whether there is any element of retrospection whereby any tax savings already 
made when the loophole is closed will be lost.   This can all be summarised in the parameter 
, 0 1ϕ ϕ≤ ≤  that measures the fraction of the possible tax saving TΔ  that the taxpayer 
expects to retain in the event of the tax authority’s taking legislative action to close the 
scheme.  The value of ϕ  will be influenced by things like disclosure powers which will affect 
the speed by which the tax authority becomes aware of the existence of certain types of 
scheme and whether or not some element of retrospection applies.    
 
For simplicity it is assumed that ϕ   does not vary with the scheme that is used, and that the 
taxpayer has a pretty good idea of the value of ϕ  based on past experience of how quickly 
and frequently loopholes get shut.  
 
Risk 4. Successful Challenge to Legally Ineffective Schemes 
 If the scheme is ineffective (fails in law) the taxpayer has to consider the possibility that the 
tax authority successfully challenges it and recovers all the tax plus interest, plus, possibly, a 
penalty.  Let  be probability that the tax authority successfully challenge the 
scheme.  This is the product of 3 underlying probabilities:   
, 0 1c cp p≤ ≤
• that the tax authority investigates the taxpayers;  
• if it investigates, that it discovers the scheme has been used; 
• if it discovers, it successfully demonstrates  that the scheme fails and collects all the tax 
plus interest plus penalties.   
For the purposes of this analysis, we do not need to keep track of these separate underlying 
probabilities.  
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For simplicity it is assumed that cp does not vary across schemes or taxpayers.  It would be 
relatively straightforward to introduce a more general treatment, but this is not central to the 
analysis.  Finally it is assumed that through experience, interaction with other taxpayers, 
media coverage etc, taxpayers have a good understanding of the value of cp .  
 
Risk 5  Imposition of Penalty 
The final risk that the taxpayer faces is that if the scheme is ineffective and is successfully 
challenged then the taxpayer will not only have to pay back all the tax (plus interest), but may 
in addition have to pay a penalty, which  is typically a fraction of the tax saved by the 
scheme. In practice there is some discretion as to the extent of the penalty imposed , so let 
 be the expected fraction of the tax savings that will be imposed as a penalty.  While in 
principle this could vary across schemes for simplicity it will be assumed that this is the same 
for all schemes. 
0≥f
 
It is important to recognise that some taxpayers may also suffer some reputational damage if 
they use an ineffective scheme that is effectively challenged.   While there may be a number 
of factor’s affecting the extent of this damage, for simplicity I will assume that it is 
proportional to the size of the taxpayer’s tax base,  Y .    Let 0≥ρ  be the factor of 
proportionality and call this the reputational concern of the taxpayer.  This is a parameter that 
varies across taxpayers.   
 
Finally let    be the cost of acquiring this particular scheme0>C 11.    This will either be the 
cost of devising the scheme in house or else the price of buying the scheme in the market.  In 
the latter case it is assumed that the price takes the form of an upfront fee.  In general these 
costs will vary across schemes.  In particular there are a number of reasons for thinking that 
schemes that are more likely to be legally effective will be more expensive:    
• more – or more expensive - resources may be required to check that all the steps in a 
given scheme really do work in law; 
• schemes that are to work in law will have to be installed more carefully; 
                                                          
11 The cost of acquiring a scheme includes the cost of implementing it.  In principle these  costs can encompass 
not just the costs of purchasing/devising and implementing the scheme but also any real economic costs the 
taxpayer faces in aligning its business with the tax system.  The more artificial is a tax avoidance scheme, the 
lower these latter costs will be. 
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• schemes that are close to tax planning may involve the taxpayer in having to re-deploy 
real economic resources rather than using artificial paper transactions to lower taxes.   
 
Bringing this all together, we can see that the net gain to a taxpayer with tax base Y  and 
reputational concern ρ from acquiring any particular scheme is: 
 
     (1) ( ) ( )( , ) (1 ). (1 ).(1 ) (1 ). . 1e u u e c e c e cY tY p p p p p p p f p p Yπ ρ ϕ ρ⎡ ⎤= Δ + − + − − − − − − −⎣ ⎦ C
 
The first term on the RHS of (1) is the expected net financial benefit to the taxpayer from 
acquiring the scheme.  The first term in square brackets is the expected fraction of the full tax 
saving, , that the taxpayer will obtain from acquiring the scheme if it turns out to be 
effective   The second is the expected fraction of the full tax saving if the scheme is 
ineffective but the tax authority fails to successfully challenge it.  The third terms is the 
expected loss to the taxpayer (as a fraction of the full tax saving)  if the scheme turns out to 
be ineffective, the tax authority mounts a successful challenge and not only recovers all the 
tax (plus interest) but imposes a penalty.    The second term on the RHS of (1) is the expected 
cost to the taxpayer’s reputation from acquiring a scheme that turns out to be legally 
ineffective and is successfully shown to be so by the tax authority.  The final term on the 
RHS of (1) is the cost of acquiring (and implementing) the scheme
tYΔ
12, which, as noted, takes 
the form of an upfront charge   
 
The expression in (1) can be re-written as: 
 
      [ ] [ ]{ }( , ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )e u u e c e cY tY p p p p p f p p Yπ ρ ϕ ρ= Δ + − + − − + − − −C
                                                          
. (2) 
 
Let us make the standard and quite realistic13  assumption  that the probability of successful 
challenge of an ineffective scheme is sufficiently low that  
12 Notice that what this brings out is that there is always at least one downside to avoidance – the cost of 
acquiring  the scheme.  For taxpayers with concerns about their reputation there will additionally be a downside 
associated with avoidance schemes that turn out to be ineffective and are successfully challenged. 
 
13 If this assumption failed to hold nobody would ever acquire a scheme that  was close to pure evasion,   i.e.  
,  and yet evasion clearly takes place.   0ep ≈
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    1 .     (3) (1 )cp f− + > 0
Given (3), the term in curly brackets on RHS of (2) is positive and less than 1 and represents 
the fraction of the full tax savings, tYΔ  that the taxpayer can expect from the scheme.  We 
can think of this as measuring the quality of the scheme – denoted  by q, so  
 
   [ ] [ ](1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )e u u e cq p p p p p fϕ= + − + − − + .  (4) 
 
In summary a scheme is characterised by: 
• the 5 parameters )( , , , ,e u cp p p fϕ  which capture the 5 risks faced by the taxpayer; 
• the size of the tax wedge, tΔ  that this class of avoidance schemes is trying to exploit; 
• the costs C  of acquiring the scheme.   
 
Given our assumptions two of the risk parameters  - and e up p  - will vary across schemes as 
will the costs of acquiring a scheme.  So the taxpayer can affect the risks by the decision 
about which scheme to acquire – albeit at a price.   The probability of a scheme’s being 
legally effective, ep , is purely a feature of the scheme and cannot be affected by the 
government/tax authority.  While up  - the risk that the legislation on which a scheme 
depends will remain unchanged – will also vary across schemes depending on the details of 
the how they are constructed,  the precise values of up attaching to various schemes will also 
be influenced by the tax authority through the guidance that it offers.  The remaining risk 
parameters ,c ,p fϕ  as well as the tax wedge tΔ  being exploited by this particular class of 
schemes are all constant across schemes and will all also be affected by policies pursued by 
the tax authority and/or government. 
 
The five risk parameters affect the quality, q, of a scheme.  Notice that quality is 
monotonically increasing in   and  up ϕ ; monotonically decreasing in   and  cp f .  However it 
it will be monotonically increasing, constant or decreasing in ep  according as    
( )1 1 (1u u c )p p pϕ > f+ − − +< .        (5) 
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So a taxpayer will perceive a less legally effective scheme to be of higher quality if the risk of 
being effectively challenged  and the consequent penalty is very low, while the risk of having 
the loophole changed quickly is quite high.  
 
The final aspect of any given scheme that we need to understand is the tax-gap to which its 
acquisition would give rise. The tax gap is a measure of the amount of tax that the tax 
authority ultimately fails to collect through various types of non-compliance.  There are 
definitional issues surrounding the tax gap and in particular the question of how avoidance 
gets treated.  It would be generally agreed that if a taxpayer acquires a scheme that is 
illegal/ineffective, then the taxpayer has been non-compliant.  However this will only give 
rise to a tax gap if the authority fails to successfully challenge the scheme and recover the tax 
– though it is important to note that the income raised from any penalties that are imposed is 
typically not counted as helping to reduce the tax gap. 
 
If the taxpayer acquires a scheme that is effective and if the authority decides not to change 
the legislation on which the scheme depends for its effectiveness then this suggests that the 
scheme complies with both the letter and the spirit of the legislation and so acquiring such a 
scheme would not count as non-compliance.  However if the authority decides to close the 
loophole then the taxpayer has not complied with the spirit of the legislation, and the 
purchase of this scheme would constitute non-compliance.  If a scheme is effective the tax 
authority has no powers to recover tax so the extent to which this non-compliance gives rise 
to a tax-gap depends on the speed with which the legislation is closed.   
 
Let g denote the fraction of the potential tax saving .t YΔ that will ultimately fail to be 
collected if a taxpayer purchases a generic scheme.  Given our above discussion this is 
defined as  
   ( ) ( ) ( ). 1 . 1 . 1 0e u e cg p p p pϕ= − + − − ≥ .   (6) 
 
Notice that g = 0 if an only if a scheme is fully compliant with the letter and the spirit of the 
legislation that forms the basis of its effectiveness, and which consequently will not be 
changed.   
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Now other things being equal the tax authority prefers schemes with lower tax gaps to those 
with higher tax gaps.  The interesting question is therefore how its ranking of schemes 
compares to the quality ranking by taxpayers and whether their views are always opposed to 
one another or might sometimes be aligned.  From (4)  and (6) we see while an increase in 
up  raises the quality of a scheme it lowers the tax gap.  However the tax gap will be 
monotonically increasing, constant or decreasing in ep  according as    
( )1 1u cp pϕ >− −< .           (7) 
So if  
• the chances of successfully challenging a scheme if it is ineffective is quite high,  
• schemes in this area are typically not compliant with the spirit of the law so the tax 
authority is very likely to want to close the loophole, 
• but it just takes a long time to spot and change the legislation,  
then the tax gap will be higher the more legally effective is the scheme.  
 
The following proposition summarises the circumstances under which the perception of 
quality by the taxpayer is aligned with that of the tax authority. 
 
Proposition 1   Schemes that are perceived to be of higher quality by the taxpayer will have 
lower tax gaps if: 
(i)  they have the same degree of legal effectiveness;   
(ii)  they have the same probability, up ,  that the legislation on which they depend will be 
changed and if ( ) ( ) ( )c u up p p p ϕ− − + − < −1 1c f < 1 cp .    
 
1.3  The Market for Schemes 
As mentioned above we want to think of there being a differentiated products market that 
produces a variety of schemes within a particular class that all bring about the same reduction 
 on a given tax base Y.    The schemes work in different ways and so offer taxpayers 
different exposures to the 5 risks identified above.  Schemes differ in:      
tΔ
• ep  - the probability that they work in law; 
• up  - the perceived probability that the tax authority will leave unchanged the legislation 
on which the scheme depends; 
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• C - the costs of acquiring the scheme.  
 
In relation to the costs to the taxpayer of acquiring a scheme, C , in this paper it is assumed 
that: 
(i) the market for schemes is perfectly competitive; 
(ii) each type of scheme is produced at a constant marginal  cost. 
Given these assumptions the cost to the taxpayer of acquiring the various schemes are 
constant and unaffected by the various policies pursued by the tax authority14.   
 
While there could be very many schemes in the market with different types of taxpayer 
acquiring different schemes, it will simplify the analysis greatly if we assume that there just 
two schemes.   The  first is a pure avoidance scheme for which  1, 1e up p= ≤
1up
  while the 
second is a scheme that lies in the grey area where 1,ep < <  and, moreover the value of 
up  is lower for this scheme that got the first.   
 
As noted above there is no guarantee that just because the first scheme is certainly legally 
effective it is of a higher quality than the second scheme.  But in fact the most interesting 
analysis follows by assuming that this is the case and this is the assumption that will be 
maintained throughout the analysis in rest of the paper.   So call the first scheme the high 
quality scheme and  the second the low quality scheme and characterise then by  
 
    . (8) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
0 1; 0 1;
0 1 1 1 (1 ) 1
L H L H
e e u u
L L L L L H H H
e u u e c u u
p p p p
q p p p p p f q p pϕ ϕ
< < = < < ≤
⎡ ⎤< = + − + − − + < = + − ≤⎣ ⎦ 1
 
If the costs of acquiring the two schemes are denoted by ,H LC C  respectively, then the net 
gains from acquiring these two schemes are: 
     
( , ) . .H HY t Y qπ ρ = Δ − HC      (9) 
( )( , ) . . 1 .L L Le cY t Y q p p Yπ ρ ρ= Δ − − − LC
                                                          
    (10) 
14 A related paper, Damjanovic and Ulph (1999), analyses the effect of tax policies when there is also a market 
for schemes but when the price is endogenous.  However in that paper there is a single homogenous product.  
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 Notice that if H LC C≤  then all taxpayers would prefer the high quality scheme to the low 
quality scheme, and the low quality scheme would not be supplied in the equilibrium..  So to 
have an interesting case where both schemes exist in equilibrium it is necessary to assume 
that the high quality scheme sells at a higher price than the low quality scheme.  Indeed, as 
will become apparent, it is necessary to make the stronger assumption that the cost 
differential is greater than the quality differential: 
    1
H H
L L
C q
C q
> > .     (11) 
   
Finally notice that the tax gaps associated with these two schemes are: 
 
  
( )
( ) ( )( )
1 ;
1 1 1
H H H
u
L L L L
e u e c
g p q
g p p p p q
ϕ
ϕ
= − <
L= − + − − >    (12) 
 
so the high quality scheme may have a higher or lower tax gap than the low quality scheme. 
 
This completes the basic description of the model.  The next section sets out  the predictions 
concerning the nature of the equilibrium. 
 
 Section 2:   Equilibrium Predictions 
 
In order to understand  the impact of policy changes introduced by tax authority, we first 
need to determine which taxpayers acquire a scheme and which one this is. A taxpayer will 
acquire a particular scheme if and only if: 
(i) it gives at least as great an expected  net gain as the other scheme; 
(ii) the expected net gain is  positive.   
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2. 1 Who acquires what 
Consider first the conditions under which each of the two schemes makes a positive return for 
the taxpayer.   If we start with the high quality scheme, then since it works for sure in law, we 
see from (6) that reputational risk is not a factor affecting this consideration, and that the high 
quality scheme will be profitable as long as  the taxpayer has a sufficient large tax base.  
Specifically the high quality scheme is profitable so long as   
 
    0
.
H
H
H
CY Y
t q
> = Δ .    (13) 
 
Here 0HY  is the critical size of the tax base at which a taxpayer is just indifferent between 
acquiring the high quality scheme and having no tax scheme.   
 
Now consider the low quality scheme.  Let   
 
   ( )
. 0
1 .
LL
L
e c
t q
p p
ρ Δ= − > ,    (14) 
 
and notice that,  from (10), it follows that for all 
Lρρ ≥  the net gain from the low-quality 
scheme is negative – no matter what the values of .  In other words, there is a 
group of taxpayers with a sufficiently high reputational concern who will never acquire the 
low quality scheme – however cheap it is and however large is their tax base.     
 and LY C
 
Those who have a lower reputational risk factor will be prepared to acquire the low quality 
scheme if their tax base is sufficiently high.  So, from (10)  the low quality scheme generates 
a positive expected net gain so long as   
      ( )0 ( ) . 1 . .
L
L
L L
e c
CY Y
t q p p
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
> = Δ − −
<
     (15) 
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Here  0 ( )LY ρ  is  the critical size of the tax base at which a taxpayer with low reputational 
concern is just indifferent between acquiring the low quality scheme and having no tax 
scheme.  Notice that  
 
0
0 0(0) 0; 0; ( )   as  
L
L LdYY Y
d
ρ ρρ> > →∞ ρ→
0H
.  (16) 
 
It is also easy to see that, given (11),   
 
    .     (17) 0 (0)LY Y<
 
Now consider which of the two schemes gives the highest net gain for any given taxpayer.   
 
Let   
      
( )
( ) ( )( ) 0. 1 . .
H L
HL
H L e
L c
C C
Y
t q q p p
ρ ρ
−= >Δ − + − .   (18) 
 
This defines the critical level of income at which a taxpayer with reputational risk factor 
0≥ρ  would be just indifferent between the high quality scheme and the low quality scheme.  
A taxpayer with a larger tax base than HLY  would strictly prefer the high quality scheme, 
because the return on the higher base would better offset the higher cost of the better quality 
scheme.  A taxpayer with a  smaller tax base than HLY  would strictly prefer the low quality 
scheme, because the lower tax base could not justify the higher cost of the high quality 
scheme.  Notice also that HLY  is a strictly decreasing function of  ρ.  Greater reputational risk 
makes the low quality scheme less attractive and so taxpayers will be prepared to switch to 
the high quality scheme at a lower tax base.    
 
It is easy to see that it follows from (11) that 
 
    0(0)HLY Y> H .     (19) 
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Finally  let  µρ  be the critical value of ρ  for which µ( ) µ( )0 0HL H LY Y Yρ ρ= = .  This is defined 
by 
   µ ( ) . 1 .1 .
L H
L HL
e c
tq q C
q Cp p
ρ ⎛ ⎞Δ= −⎜− ⎝ ⎠
L
⎟ .   (20) 
 
From (11) and (14) it follows that 
 
    µ0
Lρ ρ< < .     (21) 
 
From the above analysis we can work out how any given taxpayer ranks the three options:  
• buy neither scheme; 
• buy scheme 1; 
• buy scheme 2, 
and hence which of these decisions they make.    
 
All these ideas can be summarised in the two Figures shown below in the Annex.  In Figure 1 
all the various curves discussed above are illustrated.  Figure 2  in the Annex  shows which 
taxpayers make which decision.  This is a more schematic version of Figure 1 in which 
sections of  curvilinear functions have been represented by straight lines.  Here Points A, B 
and E correspond to the levels , respectively of the tax base.  Point 
F  corresponds to the critical reputational factor  
0(0), ,  and  (0)HL H LY Y Y
µ
0
ρ  at which the three curves 
0( ), ( )  and  0HL LY Y Yρ ρ
)(ρHLY
H  intersect.    The line AD is a linear representation of  a section of 
the curve  ,  while ED is a linear representation of  a section of the curve  .   )(0 ρLY
 
Taxpayers with characteristics that lie above the curve ADC acquire the high quality scheme.  
Those with characteristics in the area ADE acquire the low quality scheme, while those with 
characteristics that lie below 0EDC acquire neither scheme.  
 
Now taxpayers’ reputational risk factors are not readily observable -  by either tax authorities 
or social researchers – though there is some interesting research to be done to investigate this 
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further.  However there are 4 key predictions about how behaviour relates to the size of a 
taxpayer’s tax base.   
(a) The poorest taxpayers – those  for whom 0 (0)LY Y≤  - will acquire neither scheme.  
This is essentially because their tax base is too small to justify the up-front costs of 
acquiring a scheme.   
(b) There is a group of “lower tax base” taxpayers – those for whom 0  - 
who will acquire either the low quality scheme or nothing at all. 
0
0
HL YYY ≤≤
(c) There is a group of “middle tax base” taxpayers - those for whom HL - 
who will be observed to acquire either the low quality scheme or the high quality 
scheme. 
H YYY 0
0 ≤≤
(d) The richest taxpayers – those with HLYY 0≥  - will all acquire the high quality scheme.  
 
Finally notice that in the theory developed here there are four key drivers of behaviour: 
• Opportunities for avoidance.  These are given by tΔ  which affects the 
benefit/demand for avoidance and ,H LC C  which capture supply side factors that 
determine the ease of getting advice/schemes. 
• Incentives for avoidance In this model this is captured by the parameter Y.   
• Attitudes  towards avoidance.  In this model this is captured by the parameter ρ 
• Risks from avoidance These are captured by the 5 parameters ( ), , , ,e u cp p p fϕ  
 
Having determined who acquires which scheme, it is now possible to calculate the tax gap.  
 
2.2 The Tax Gap 
Assume that the two parameters ( ),Y ρ  that characterise taxpayers are jointly distributed 
across 2R+  according to the density function ( , ) 0f Y ρ >  which, for simplicity, is assumed to 
be everywhere positive.  Then it follows from the above analysis of who buys what that the 
aggregate tax gap, G, expressed in absolute terms is given by 
 
0
0
ˆ ( )
0 ( )
ˆ
ˆ0 ( )
( , )
( , ) ( , )
HL
L
HL H
YL
Y
H
Y Y
g Yf Y dYd
G t
g Yf Y dYd Yf Y dYd
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ∞ ∞ ∞
⎧ ⎫+⎪ ⎪= Δ ⎨ ⎬
ρ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
.  (22) 
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   We can see that any policy change will have three different type of effects: 
• Direct Effects  - these are defined as the effects that arise through the impact of policy 
changes  , ,L H   holding taxpayer behaviour constant. t g gΔ
• Indirect Effects: these are defined as the effects that through the impact of policy 
changes on taxpayer behaviour – whether or not they acquire a scheme, and, if so 
which one they acquire – holding  , ,L H  constant. t g gΔ
 
Notice that, to first order, changes in ρˆ  have no impact on G so these indirect or behavioural 
effects can broken into  
• Deterrence Effects.  These arise when taxpayers who previously acquired a scheme no 
longer do so15.  These can be further classified and defined as:  
o Deterrence Effects on Low Quality Schemes .  These arise when policy 
changes raise  0 ( )LY ρ  on [ ]ˆ0,ρ .  Formally 
( ) ( )ˆ 0 0 0
0
. ,L L L L LdG t g Y f Y dY d
ρ
( )ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ⎡ ⎤= −Δ ⎣ ⎦∫ .  (23) 
o  Deterrecet Effects on High Quality Schemes.  These arise when policy 
changes raise  0HY   and will affect taxpayers for whom ˆρ ρ≥ .  Formally 
( )0 0ˆ. , 0H H H H HdG t g Y f Y d dYρ ρ ρ∞⎡= − Δ⎢⎣ ∫ ⎤⎥⎦    (24) 
• Indirect Switching Effects  These will arise to the extent that the policy changes affect  
( )HLY ρ  on [ ]ˆ0,ρ .   We  have   
( ) ˆ
0
. ( ). ( ),S L H HL HL HLdG t g g Y f Y dY d
ρ
( )ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ⎡ ⎤= Δ − ⎣ ⎦∫ . (25) 
The sign of this depends on not just the direction in which ( )HLY ρ  is shifted by 
policy but also on whether the tax gap is greater for the low quality scheme than for 
the high quality scheme.  Since at this level of generality there is no restriction on the 
latter, all that we will be able to establish in the next section is the direction in which 
( )HLY ρ  is shifted by policy.  We will say that there has been a Switching Effect 
Towards Low (resp. High) Quality  according as ( ) (0  res )
                                                          
p 0HLdY ρ > < . 
15 Obviously this can happen in reverse and taxpayers who previously did not acquire a scheme now choose to 
do so.  In this case the deterrence effect will be negative and could be referred to as an acquisition effect. 
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Section 3:   Comparative Static  Predictions 
 
This section examines the impact of various types of policy on taxpayer behaviour and hence, 
from (23) – (25) the indirect effects of these policies on the tax gap.  Changes in all six of the 
policy parameters , , , ,   and  e u cp p p f tϕ Δ  will be examined, but it will be useful to group 
them under four different types of policy.   
 
3.1 Penalties 
The first policy is that of increasing the penalty on failed avoidance, which in this model is 
captured by an increase in f .  From (8), (13), (15) and (18)  it is easy to see that this has no 
effect on Hq  and hence on 0HY , but will lower  and hence increase Lq ( )0LY ρ , lower 
(HLY )ρ  and reduce µρ .    Formally    
 
 
0 0 ( ) ( )0, 0 0; 0; 0
H L H L HLdq dq dY dY dY
df df df df df
ρ ρ= < ⇒ = > < . (26) 
 
The intuition behind this is very straightforward and we have: 
Proposition 2   An increase in the penalty for failed avoidance will produce: 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on the Low Quality Scheme; 
• a zero Deterrence Effect on the High  Quality Scheme; 
•  a Switching Effect Towards High Quality.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 in the Annex where the new boundaries are represented by 
dashed lines.  What this shows is that taxpayers in the area HGDE who previously acquired 
the low quality scheme now acquire no scheme – the  Low Quality Deterrence Effect - while 
those in the area ADGF now switch from acquiring the low quality scheme to acquiring the 
high quality scheme – the High Quality Switching Effect. 
 
3.2 Disclosure/Information 
The second policy is that of disclosure or of greater information powers for tax authorities to 
learn what schemes are in the market and who is using them.   This has two parts.  First it 
requires companies that market schemes to reveal their existence and how they work as soon 
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as they are brought to market.  Each scheme is then given a number by the tax authority and 
any taxpayer who acquires and uses a scheme is required to put the number of the scheme on 
their tax return.  Corresponding to these two different features of the policy we can think of  
disclosure having two effects. 
(a) For schemes that are effective but where the tax authority would have wanted to close the 
loophole on which they depend for their effectiveness, the tax authority discovers the 
schemes are in operation more quickly and closes them down faster.  This can be captured 
in the model as a reduction in ϕ16.    
(b) For ineffective schemes it raises the probability of detection and, probably, the 
effectiveness of investigation, which can be captured in the model as an increase in cp .  
Consider these effects in turn 
  
3.2.1  Earlier Closure of Loopholes 
Earlier closure of loopholes will obviously lower the potential return on both types of scheme 
making them less attractive to taxpayers.  This shows up in the formal model in the fact that, 
as is easily seen from (8), a reduction in ϕ lowers both  and  H Lq q
0HY
 and hence, from (13) and 
(15)  raises both .   Formally  0 ( )  and  LY ρ
 
0 0 ( )0, 0 0; 0
H L H Ldq dq dY dY
d d d d
ρ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− < − < ⇒ − > − >   (27) 
 
However the impact of this policy on the difference in quality between the two schemes and 
hence, from (18),  on ( )HLY ρ  and so the Switching Effect is ambiguous.  The reason is that 
the high quality scheme is more likely to be effective - and so it is more likely that loophole 
closure is a relevant risk to be considered – but the risk of having the loophole closed is lower 
so it is not clear that closing loopholes faster matters more for high quality schemes than for 
low quality schemes. Formally  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0H L HLL L He u ud q q dYp p pd d ρϕ ϕ
− > >− = − − − ⇒ − 0< < .  (28) 
                                                          
16 A special case of the policy of greater information powers is that of  retrospection.  Under this provision 
taxpayers are told (in advance) they will required to repay all tax savings made on any scheme that is closed.  
This can be captured in the model as a special case in which ϕ is driven to zer. 
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These results are summarised in: 
Proposition 3   Earlier closure of loopholes will produce: 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on the Low Quality Scheme; 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on the High  Quality Scheme; 
•  a Switching Effect that can go in either direction..  
 
The effect of earlier closure of loopholes is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case where 
( )
0
HLdY
d
ρ
ϕ− <  and so the Switching Effect is towards the High Quality scheme and in Figure 
5 for the case where 
( )
0
HLdY
d
ρ
ϕ− >  and so the Switching Effect is in the other direction.  In 
Figure 4  the Low Quality Deterrence Effect is represented by the area HGJDE while the 
High Quality Deterrence Effect is represented by the area JKLD.  The Switching Effect 
Towards the High Quality Scheme is represented by the area AJGF.   .  In Figure 5  the Low 
Quality Deterrence Effect is represented by the area HGDE while the High Quality 
Deterrence Effect is represented by the area JKLDG.  The Switching Effect Towards the High 
Quality Scheme is represented by the area AGJF.    
 
3.2.2 Higher Risk of Successful Challenge 
It is it is intuitively obvious and easy to see more formally from (8)  that an increase in the 
risk of successful challenge has exactly the same qualitative effect as an increase in the 
expected penalty that will be imposed conditional on being challenged.  So the predictions 
are as in (26) and as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Proposition 4 A greater risk of successful challenge has exactly the same behavioural effects 
as an increased penalty on failed avoidance  The latter are stated in Proposition 2 
 
3.3 Designing Out Avoidance 
The third type of policy that we can consider is that of  reducing the incentive for avoidance 
through re-designing tax policy in a way that reduces the wedges in the tax system under 
which very similar activities get taxed at the different rates.  Within the framework adopted 
here we can think of as this as a reduction in tΔ .  From (8) this has no impact on either 
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  or  H Lq q  though from (13), (15) and (18) this directly increases ( )0 0,   and  ( )H L HLY Y Yρ ρ . 
Formally 
 
   
0 0 ( ) ( )0; 0; 0
H L HLdY dY dY
d t d t d t
ρ ρ− > − > − >Δ Δ Δ .   (29) 
 
Proposition 5  Policy reforms which lower the opportunity for avoidance will produce: 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on the Low Quality Scheme; 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on the High Quality Scheme; 
• a Switching Effect Towards Low Quality..   
 
The intuition is clear.  Lowering the tax wedge reduces the gain from acquiring an avoidance 
scheme, while costs remain unaltered, so creating a deterrence effect on both types of 
scheme.  On the other hand precisely because one scheme is of higher quality than another 
the reduction in the tax wedge will have a bigger reduction in its net return than in that of the 
lower quality scheme, causing taxpayers to switch towards the low-quality scheme. The 
comparative static predictions are illustrated in Figure 5, where the interpretation is just as 
above in section 3.2.1 
 
3.4 Better Guidance 
The final type of policy that will be analysed is that of giving better guidance as to how well 
various tax schemes fit with the spirit of the legislation – and so the likelihood of the 
legislation on which schemes depend for their effectiveness being changed.  As indicated in 
Section 1 this policy can be captured in the current framework as an increase in Hup  and a 
reduction in Lup .   This makes high quality schemes more attractive and low quality schemes 
less attractive.  The way this shows up is that, from (8), the effect of these changes in up  will 
be to increase Hq
  and  H
 and lower .  From (13), (15) and (18) these changes will in turn lower 
both 
L
uq
0 ( )HLY Y ρ  and  raise 0 ( )LY ρ .  Formally: 
 
0 0 ( ) ( ) 0
HL
u u
dY
dp
ρ >0, 0 0; 0;
H L H L
u u
dq dq dY dY
dp df dp dp
ρ> < ⇒ < > . (30) 
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Thus we have 
Proposition 6   A policy of giving better guidance will produce: 
• a positive Deterrence Effect on Low Quality Schemes; 
• a negative Deterrence Effect on High Quality Schemes; 
• a Switching Effect Towards High Quality.   
 
These effects are illustrated in Figure 6 where area EHGJ represents the positive Deterrence 
Effect on Low Quality Schemes;  area DLKJ represents the negative Deterrence Effect on 
High Quality Schemes; and area ADJGF  the Switching Effect Towards High Quality. 
 
In summary,  the analysis in this section has shown that the various policies can have very 
different effects on behaviour.  Policy design and the earlier closure of loopholes will have 
deterrence effects on both high and low quality schemes, and while the former definitely 
switches taxpayers towards low quality schemes the switching effect of the latter can go in 
either direction.  Increased penalties and  the more effective challenging of taxpayers are 
effectively identical and generate deterrence effects only on low quality schemes and switch 
taxpayers towards high quality schemes.  Better guidance also switches taxpayers towards 
high quality schemes and while it deters the acquisition of low quality schemes will promote 
the acquisition of high quality schemes.   
 
 
Section 4:  Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided a framework within which to understand the effects of a wide range 
of anti-avoidance policies that have been introduced or are under discussion by many tax 
authorities.  Such a framework needs to take seriously the supply side of tax avoidance and in 
particular the fact that the industry supplies a range of differentiated products.  An important 
feature of the approach is that it focuses on the various risks that different types of ways of 
reducing tax liability confront the taxpayer, and so recognises the multi-dimensional nature of 
the product differentiation that is in operation.   A corollary is that to have an interesting 
analysis it is also necessary to recognise the heterogeneity of taxpayers who can differ in both 
their  incentives fir tax reduction and their attitudes towards different ways of achieving this.    
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Despite this richness the framework generates some clear predictions about the different 
effects of different policies, which are summarised at the end of the previous section. 
However in order for tax authorities to determine how these policies affect the tax gap they 
need to develop an understanding of how the tax gap varies across different types of scheme.   
 
The analysis has been conducted for a particular case in which the ratio of cots is higher than 
the ratio of qualities – expression (11) – and the assumption that the higher quality scheme 
had greater legal effectiveness.  It is straightforward to check that: 
• if the inequality in (11) were reversed then the low quality scheme would never be 
acquired and the only relevant margin on which policies would operate is that of the 
deterrence effect on high quality schemes; 
• if the scheme with greater legal effectiveness is of lower quality, then there will be an 
initial regime where taxpayers with low reputational concern acquire only the low 
quality scheme, and thereafter the analysis will be much as above. 
So the analysis can be straightforwardly generalised beyond the specific case considered 
here, and there has been no essential loss of generality in restricting attention to this case. 
 
Nevertheless the framework considered here is extremely simple and there are many 
extensions that need to be made.   
• The framework assumes risk neutral taxpayers, and that the only way in which 
attitudes/values get to play a role is through reputational considerations.  It is 
important to examine the implications of a more general treatment of risk and values.  
• The supply side is very under-developed.  A proper treatment of the supply side 
would recognise that the market for schemes is highly oligopolistic and that the prices 
of various schemes are endogenous, and so influenced by policy.   Damjanovic and 
Ulph (2009) do this for the case where there is a single homogeneous product and 
show that many standard predictions in the tax literature can be reversed when the 
price of tax products is endogenous.   
• Finally while paper examines the impact of policies on the tax gap the full welfare 
implications have not been developed.  This warrants more careful treatment.  
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